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Abstract. The statistical-physics-based Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange offers a 
new and simple unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payment. The key 
exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure so that neither 
mathematics- nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The ohmic connection and the 
short wiring lengths between the chips in the card and the terminal constitute an ideal setting for the 
KLJN protocol, and even its simplest versions offer unprecedented security and privacy for 
credit/debit card chips and applications of physical unclonable functions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Modern chip-based credit, debit and bank cards use physical unclonable function (PUF) 
hardware keys for payment, and their protocol and cryptography employ the Europay, 
MasterCard and Visa (EMV) scheme [1]. Various levels of strengths for PUF hardware 
keys are described in the literature [2]. The PUF in these cards is weak because it relies 
on conditionally secure communication, data authentication and a private key stored in a 
secure memory that must be able to self-destruct when tampered with. Thus the cards’ 
software-based secure communication protocols (such as RSA [1]) offer nothing but 
conditional security, and it may not be surprising that criminals have been able to crack 
the EMV system and steal large amounts of money [1]. In fact, the hacking referred to 
above [1] was even simpler and utilized simple vulnerabilities caused by an incomplete 
security and authentication protocol (including a man-in-the-middle-attack).  
 
For systems with complete conditional security and authentication protocols, though it 
appears unlikely that a hacker has sufficient computational power or is able to invent a 
sufficiently efficient factoring algorithm to crack the key, a skilled hacker can efficiently 
employ a known-plaintext attack, which constitutes the major vulnerability of all 
conventional mathematics-based secure key exchange protocols [3].  
 
For high-security credit cards and PUF applications, it is essential to use unconditionally 
secure communication [3] which is immune also against known-plaintext attacks; 
otherwise the cards’ entire PUF protocol is highly vulnerable and hackers will no doubt 
in the foreseeable future develop devices to copy them. Unconditionally secure key 
exchange with one-time-pad (OTP) encryption makes the communication unconditionally 
secure and immune against any type of attack, including mathematics-based and 
statistics-based alternatives.   
 
Up till now, only two schemes offer unconditional security: (i) quantum encryption 
including its enhanced versions [3] and (ii) the electronic-noise-based Kirchhoff-law–
Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme [4] which is the main topic of the present article and is 
elaborated below. A disadvantage of quantum encryption is that it is bulky and hence it 
cannot be integrated on a chip. KLJN, on the other hand, offers the possibility of chip 
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integration. The latter scheme requires electrical wire connection between the 
communicating parties, which makes it well suited for chip-based credit and debit cards 
which employ wire connection to communicate with the terminal during payment, and 
consequently a KLJN chip is feasible for applications. 
 
In Section 2, we briefly describe the KLJN scheme, which is the core of the 
unconditionally secure credit card protocol of unclonable credit/debit cards and PUF 
applications discussed in Section 3.  
 
2. The KLJN key exchange scheme 
The KLJN secure key exchange scheme [4–13] was proposed in 2005 [5,6] and, 
including its advanced versions [8–10], there are currently about ten different protocols. 
It is a statistical/physical competitor to quantum key exchange, and the security is based 
on Kirchhoff’s Loop Law and the Fluctuation–Dissipation Theorem. The security of the 
ideal KLJN scheme is as strong as the impossibility to build a perpetual motion machine 
of the second kind.  
 
Figure 1 depicts a binary version of the KLJN scheme and shows that, during a single-bit 
exchange, the communicating parties (Alice and Bob) connect their randomly chosen 
resistor (including its Johnson noise generator) to a wire channel. These resistors are 
randomly selected from the publicly known set RL,RH{ } , RL ≠ RH , representing the Low 
and High bit values. The Gaussian voltage noise generators—mimicking the Fluctuation–
Dissipation Theorem and delivering band-limited white noise with publicly agreed 
bandwidth—produce enhanced thermal (Johnson) noise at a publicly agreed effective 
temperature Teff ; typically Teff >>1010K  so that the temperature of the wire can be 
neglected. The noises are statistically independent of each other and from the noise of the 
former bit period.  
 
Fig. 1. Core of the KLJN scheme without defense circuitry [4,5] against active (invasive) attacks and attacks 
utilizing non-idealities. The RL and RH resistors, identical pairs at Alice and Bob, represent the Low (L) and 
High (H) bit values. The corresponding noise spectra SL and SH also form identical pairs at the two ends, but 
they belong to independent Gaussian stochastic processes. Both parties are at the same temperature, and thus the 
net power flow is zero. The LH and HL bit situations of Alice and Bob produce identical voltage and current 
noise spectra, Su and Si, in the wire, implying that they represent a secure bit exchange. The LL and HH bit 
arrangements, which occur in 50% of the cases, have singular noise levels in the wire, and hence they do not 
offer security because Eve can distinguish them. Consequently 50% of the bits must be discarded. This system 
works also with arbitrary, non-binary resistor values as an analog circuitry to exchange continuum information 
about the distribution of random resistors. 
In the case of secure bit exchange—i.e., the LH or HL bit situations for Alice and Bob—
an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot distinguish between these two situations by measuring the 
noise spectra, Su ( f ) and  Si ( f ) , of voltage and/or current in the cable, respectively, 
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because the LH and HL noise levels are identical (degenerated). Thus when Alice and 
Bob detect the noise spectra (or noise levels) characteristic of the LH and HL situation, 
they know that the other party has the opposite bit and that this bit is secure. Then one of 
them will invert the bit (it is publicly pre-agreed who will do this) to get the same key bit 
as the other party. The KLJN scheme offers unconditional (information theoretic) 
security under both ideal and slightly non-ideal (i.e., practical) conditions [4]. 
  
The security against active (invasive) attacks is provided by the robustness of classical-
physical quantities, which guarantees that they can be continuously monitored and 
exchanged between Alice and Bob via authenticated communication [11,12]. Therefore 
the system, and the consistency of the measured and exchanged voltage and current data 
with known cable parameters and model, can be checked continuously and 
deterministically without destroying these data, which is totally different from the case of 
a quantum key distribution. The same defense method provides natural immunity against 
the man-in-the-middle attack [11], which was part of the successful credit card attack 
described before [1]. 
 
One should keep in mind that the KLJN secure information exchanger is basically an 
analog circuit and can work with arbitrary resistances because, even if the resistance 
values are not pre-agreed, Alice can calculate Bob’s resistance from the measured data 
[5] by using Johnson’s formula, and vice versa. For example, by using the measured 
current spectrum in the wire one obtains 
 
 
RB =
4kTeff
Si
− RA  ,        (1) 
 
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. It is important to note that Eve is also able to determine 
an arbitrary, non-pre-agreed (non-publicly known) resistor pair connected to the line by 
using measured voltage and current spectra [5]. The two solutions of the relevant second 
order equation provide two resistance values of the pair according to 
 
R1,2 =
4kTSu ± 4kTSu( )2 − 4Su3Si
2SuSi
 .       (2) 
 
However, Eve cannot determine which resistor is with Alice and which is with Bob, and 
hence the information exchange about the distribution of arbitrary, non-binary resistor 
values is secure in the original KLJN system. 
 
Under ideal conditions, the system delineated above offers unconditional (information 
theoretic) security against passive (listening) attacks only. To achieve unconditional 
security against active (invasive) attacks, and/or attacks that utilize non-ideal features of 
the building elements, the following extra elements are essential: (a) an external Gaussian 
noise generator to emulate thermal noise [5] and to have stable noise temperature with 
high accuracy, (b) filters for limiting the frequency range to the measurement bandwidth 
and to the no-wave limit [5], and (c) measurement of the instantaneous voltage and 
current values at the two ends (by Alice and Bob) and comparison of them via an 
authenticated public channel [11] or, in more advanced set-ups, with a cable simulation 
model fed by real-time data [12]. A difference between the two measurements in (c) 
serves as an indication of invasive eavesdropping, and the corresponding bits must be 
discarded. Section 3 below discusses the number of secure bits consumed by the 
authentication.  
 
Several active attacks have been proposed against the KLJN system [5,11,12], but the 
defense method mentioned above is able to protect the system and maintain its 
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unconditional security under general conditions [12]. Specifically, the KLJN system has 
been proposed to deliver unconditional security for hardware in computers, games and 
instruments [13] and to be used as a PUF device [2].  
 
3. The new credit/debit/PUF card protocol 
The credit/debit/PUF card (referred to as the “Card” below) is used by the consumer at 
the terminal where the Card is plugged in, and a wire connection is then built between the 
chip in the Card and the interface in the terminal as indicated in Figure 2. The terminal 
interface communicates with a server (located at banks, etc.), which is not shown in this 
figure. We furthermore assume that the communication between the terminal and the 
server is secure and free from malevolent parties. The protocol entails several phases as 
elaborated in detail below. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Core hardware scheme of the terminal and the Card chip. Units regarding terminal–server 
communication, transaction input, etc., are not shown. 
  
 
3.1. Private key initialization during fabrication 
During initialization, a private key—which is a binary bit-string C—is generated by a 
true random-number generator. It will be used for the authentication of current and 
voltage data during the KLJN key exchange and also for the authentication of the Card.  
 
There is another memory location for a separate private key, B, which is used for the 
encryption; that memory section is left empty during fabrication. The private key C is 
stored on the server at a memory location that is associated with the publicly known card 
identification data (the public key), such as card number, cardholder’s name, expiration 
date, etc. The private key is also stored in the tamper-proof secure memory on the Card. 
 
Below, we use the term “session” to signify the entire card transaction process, including 
the “authentication” and the actual “transaction”. 
 
3.2. Authentication of the Card 
During its use, when the Card is inserted into the terminal, the authentication of the Card 
takes place according to the steps below: 
 
(i) the Card sends its publicly known card identification data (the public key) to the 
processor in the terminal, which forwards these data to the server;  
 
(ii) the server locates the corresponding private key in its memory and forwards that 
information to the processor in the terminal; 
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(iii) the Card and terminal execute a KLJN key exchange; 
 
(iv) authentication of the Card takes place during the verification of the current and 
voltage data, and the comparison will indicate a discrepancy and thus an active attack if 
an incorrect private key is used; the communication is then terminated, the session is 
broken, and the fact that an attack has taken place is recorded. The card is canceled after a 
certain small number M of broken sessions. It is essential that the private key C contains 
enough non-overlapping (independent) bits to cover the (M – 1) broken sessions and the 
additional procedure, which is either another broken session or a successful session. 
3.3. Transaction 
During the transaction, the Card and the terminal encrypt their communication by the 
newly-generated private key B. This communication includes also the identification of 
the user (via a PIN code), if needed. This step should also use an OTP cipher to provide 
unconditional security, particularly for the known-plain-text parts of the communication. 
After the transaction, the key B is deleted. 
3.4. Generating and sharing the new and unconditionally secure authentication key 
During each successful use of the Card, a new and independent unconditionally secure 
private key C is generated and is recorded for the next card session. As a consequence of 
the short distance (< 0.1 meter) between the key chips in the Card and the terminal, the 
conditions are practically ideal and the key exchange can take place at high speed and 
with minimal information leak towards passive (listening) attacks. Nevertheless, a simple 
three-stage XOR-based privacy amplification [14] (yielding an eightfold slowdown) may 
be applied to account for unforeseen situations.  
 
The private key C is used for authentication of current and voltage data during the KLJN 
key exchange. Assuming simple hashing-based [15] data authentication, the minimum 
length  NC  of C is of the order of 
 
 NC ≈ M log2 Nd( )   ,                   (3) 
 
where Nd is the length of the string containing the current- and voltage-sampling data 
during a successful session and M was defined above.  
 
3.5  Speed of the protocol 
Considering the very short wire separation between the Card chip and the chip in the 
terminal, one can conclude that the practical key exchange speed for the KLJN scheme is 
not limited by distance [5] but by electronics. Inexpensive chip design allows 100-kHz 
bandwidth in an effortless way, which translates to a KLJN key exchange speed of about 
thousand bits/second. This rate guarantees that the generation/sharing of the new KLJN 
key, which is the most time consuming process of the protocol, takes only two to three 
seconds even if long private keys (such as 1024-bits) are used.  
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
We showed that the KLJN key exchange scheme offers an unconditionally secure, simple 
and unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payments. The key 
exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure, and thus 
neither mathematics- nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The 
proposed simple protocol offers unprecedented security for credit/debit card chips and 
PUF applications by providing new, unconditionally secure private keys after each 
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transaction. The projected costs of the proposed unconditionally secure chip are of the 
same order of magnitude as the cost of today’s conditionally secure credit card chips. 
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